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Abstract—In this study we produce a continuous 
authentication scheme that adjusts an adaptive threshold for 
touchscreen interaction based on trust in passively collected sensor 
data. Our framework unobtrusively compares real-time sensor 
data of a user to historic data and adjusts a trust parameter based 
on the similarity. We show that the trust parameter can be used to 
adjust an adaptive threshold in continuous authentication 
schemes. The framework passively models temporal, spatial and 
activity scenarios using sensor data such as location, surrounding 
devices, wifi networks, ambient noise, movements, user activity, 
ambient light, proximity to objects and ambient pressure from 
study participants. Deviations from the models increases the level 
of threat the device perceives from the scenario. We also model the 
user touch-screen interactions. The touch-screen interactions are 
authenticated against a threshold that is continually adjusted 
based on the perceived trust. This scheme provides greater nuance 
between security and usability, enabling more refined decisions. 
We present our novel framework and threshold adjustment 
criteria and validate our framework on two state-of-the-art sensor 
datasets. Our framework achieves up to a 20.38% increase in 
accuracy compared to the static threshold system.  
Index Terms—Continuous authentication, intrusion detection, 
trust, biometrics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile devices have become one of the most prevalent and 
widely used technologies of our time. Most mobile applications 
require and store private information about the user that could 
be used for malicious and fraudulent behavior if obtained by 
impostors. Modern devices present the option of a security 
mechanism such as a PIN, password or pattern but recent 
research has shown that such security mechanisms can be 
bypassed through a variety of forgery attacks, such as the 
smudge attack [1]. Furthermore, whilst these mechanisms 
provide a layer of device security, they do not persist for the 
duration of device usage meaning that once a device has been 
logged in there are typically no other security checks. Lastly, 
research has suggested that many users see a security 
mechanism as an inconvenience and disable the functionality 
entirely []. 
To address the issues with current mobile security 
mechanisms, studies propose continuous authentication (also 
known as active authentication) techniques [2]. Most mobile 
techniques for continuous authentication typically collect 
biometric data from the device during usage and use it to profile 
a user such that future data collected may be compared to the 
profile. The success of individual biometric modalities has 
resulted in studies successfully combining them to obtain 
improved accuracy [3]. In most schemes, data is collected either 
as explicit interaction occurs (e.g.: each touchscreen swipe) or 
passively in the background (e.g.: location at each time 
interval).  
Thresholds chosen in continuous authentication schemes are 
often based on an EER (equal error rate), the threshold at which 
the FAR (false acceptance rate) is equal to the FRR (false 
rejection rate) [2]. Several schemes do, however, present a 
thresholds that can dynamically update but don’t update in real-
time [4] or lack nuance [5]. The use of passive sensor data for 
trust has been of interest to industry recently, with Google 
incorporating Smart Lock [30] into Android. As with similar 
studies, however, their approach lacks nuance and requires use 
interaction. Current research has focused very little on 
unobtrusively adapting the trade-off of usability and security. 
In this paper the main focus is on providing a continuous 
authentication scheme that addresses the need for different 
levels of usability and security at different times. We 
hypothesize that by leveraging passively collected data (such as 
location [6]) to dictate thresholds for interaction data (such as 
touch [2]), we can dynamically adapt the confidence required 
from interactive continuous authentication techniques. We posit 
that the passive and interactive biometrics can work together in 
our scheme to provide more refined and nuanced decisions by 
adapting to the most appropriate usability and security for the 
specific scenario. We show our adaptive threshold technique 
improves on the state-of-the-art touchscreen authentication 
methods. The main contributions of this paper are: 
• A novel proof-of-concept trust framework for a system 
employing collected passive sensor data to adapt the 
threshold used for authenticating interaction data 
providing refined usability and security. We show this can 
improve on the current state-of-the-art schemes. 
• We propose new criteria for threshold adaption based on 
passively collected sensor data. We show how we adjust 
the threshold for interactive authentication based on the 
trust of sensor data. We show the performance 
enhancement and the compromise between security and 
usability. 
• We show the robustness of our scheme against different 
attackers due to the unique combination of interactive and 
passive biometric data. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we briefly summarise the previous work in the areas of 
continuous authentication, passive and interactive biometric 
data and threshold and trust mechanisms. Section III presents 
the general idea for our system and describes our unique 
approach. Section IV describes the experiments we performed 
on our system and discusses the results we obtained. Section V 
concludes our research and Section VI discusses the future 
work that can be derived from our system. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Continuous authentication research on mobile devices has 
produced a variety of different schemes. Collected modalities 
include biometrics that require interaction (e.g.: touch-gestures) 
and modalities that collect data passively (e.g.: accelerometer 
readings). The consideration between usability and security is a 
recognised but little focused on research area. 
Interactive biometrics were used by researchers in 
Touchalytics [2]; they presented one of the first continuous 
authentication schemes using touchscreen gestures. They used 
strokes from 41 different users and achieved an EER of 0% to 
4% depending on the scenario. In [3] and [7] a continuous 
authentication scheme is presented that records touch and face 
biometrics during interaction. The authors in [3] use different 
classifiers in a stacked scheme achieving an EER of 3.77%.  
In [8] the researchers of the study introduce a continuous 
authentication scheme based on touchscreen gesture 
interactions using the notion of trust. Scores for a touchscreen 
gesture are used to adapt a trust score. The study shows this 
technique can add more nuance to systems that previously 
averaged a window of scores [2]. The thresholds in these 
schemes are static and don’t factor in the environmental context 
which reduces the compromise between usability and security.  
Passive biometrics build on the notion that humans are 
creatures of habit [9]. Such biometrics are gathered from device 
sensors in the background with no interaction necessary. In 
[31], the idea was to utilize user behavior patterns for 
authentication. They use time since the user last checked email 
and GPS location as behavioural biometrics for their study. The 
scores were combined and compared with a pre-defined 
threshold to determine whether to permit the user access. 
Several studies use passively collected sensor to make 
decisions on what explicit authentication is required and when. 
In [10] the authors propose a scheme that uses continuous 
biometrics to decide when user authentication is necessary. The 
system uses biometric data to form a trust score that is used to 
provide a level of access to the device. The study shows a 42% 
decrease in the number of times a user is required to explicitly 
authenticate. This scheme, does, however require off-device 
processing and does still have noticeable impact on usability. 
The authors of [11] authors propose CASA, a probabilistic 
framework that provides context-aware authentication. The 
scheme selects appropriate explicit authentication based on 
passive factors rather than authenticating users on these factors. 
They construct a Naïve Bayes classifier that assesses collected 
location and application usage patterns. The study found that 
they can reduce up to 68% of explicit authentications.  
In [12] the authors use a publicly available dataset containing 
passively collected GPS data, wi-fi and Bluetooth data to build 
a context profiling framework. The familiarity of the wi-fi and 
Bluetooth devices at a location are used to estimate the safety 
of the context. The trust in the context may be used to change 
the lockout time and login mechanism. The study creates 
algorithms to assess new context samples and reevaluate the 
safety of the context every 5 minutes. In their best-case 
scenario, the authors show that they can identify safe and unsafe 
contexts with an accuracy of ~85%. In [13] the authors propose 
a multi-faceted authentication scheme that aims to enhance the 
user-friendliness of authentication schemes by using passive 
sensor data to assess what level of access should be permitted. 
The scheme collects gait, location and proximity data from 
mobile device sensors. The data from each modality is weighted 
accordingly. One-class SVM learning techniques are trained on 
the sensor data and fused to provide a dynamic trust score on 
future samples. 
Passively collected sensor data has also been used as a 
standalone method of authentication. The researchers in [4] 
collected a dataset of wi-fi, application, cell, CPU load, light, 
noise, magnetic field and rotation data from 7 different users. 
Their scheme builds profiles using probability density 
functions. The scheme updates the threshold for the sensor data 
daily. The imposter detection accuracy ranges from 53.21% to 
99.44% depending on similarity with the genuine user 
behaviour. The study only tests their adversary experimentation 
using a single user, however, and the threshold adaption is too 
infrequent to adapt in real-time. The authentication scheme in 
[5] models data collected from user behavior event behavior to 
determine a level of trust on the current user. The scheme uses 
SMS, call, browser and Wi-Fi data. It is one of the first schemes 
to experiment with an adaptive threshold. The adaptive 
threshold is computed using a function based on past the EPWA 
(exponentially weighted average) of previous scores. The 
authors in [6] use location information as the only modality to 
authenticate users. The study proposes a Hidden Markov Model 
with a marginal smoothing technique as a novel algorithm for 
location authentication. The results show that an EER of 
20.73% can be achieved with the proposed method, however, 
knowledge of the genuine user routine can it is vulnerable to 
attack. 
Some studies have combined interactive and passive 
biometrics such as [14]. The authors in this study use passive 
and interactive biometrics including Stylometry, Application 
Usage, Web Browsing, and GPS Location. The scores are 
combined periodically taking into account their contribution to 
the final score. In SenGaurd [15] the authors propose using 
interactive and passive biometrics including touchscreen 
gestures, microphone, GPS, cellular tower, and motion sensors. 
Whilst some of these discussed studies assess the security 
and efficiency tradeoffs very few discuss the importance of 
usability and security as in [16]. We find few continuous 
authentication schemes present an adaptive compromise 
between usability and security. 
III. ADAPTIVE THRESHOLD FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we describe the novel framework that forms 
our continuous authentication system with adaptive thresholds 
based on passive sensor trust. We describe the general concept, 
our custom data capture application, how we model the 
different data collected, the classification setup we construct for 
our approach and our method for threshold selection. 
A. General Idea 
This study introduces an extendable and novel framework 
for continuous authentication that adapts the threshold required 
from touch-gesture interactions based on passive sensor trust. 
We hypothesize that adapting a threshold based on sensor data 
can adjust the usability and security based on the context and 
therefore yield more accurate and meaningful authentication 
scores as a result. 
Our proposed framework continuously collects readings 
from a set of mobile device sensors as well as the touchscreen 
gestures performed. The sensor readings are used to form a set 
of anchors. Anchors, introduced in [4], describe a specific 
scenario (e.g.: an hour of the day) and defines the characteristics 
of it. Each anchor contains probabilistic models for each sensor, 
other than the sensor used to define the anchor. These anchors 
create a user profile for a user over a training phase. Touch 
interactions during the training phase are used to train a 
classifier. After the training phase is complete, future collected 
readings from the sensors for each time period p are compared 
to the corresponding models within the appropriate anchors. 
This yields a score for each of the sensors for the readings 
collected during that time period. We use a period of 1 minute 
of sensor readings in our study. Each score represents the 
likelihood of the sensor readings belonging to the genuine user. 
The scores obtained from the sensors are then combined using 
to form a single score that represents the trust T at time tn.  
Every time the trust score is updated it is used to adapt a 
base threshold within computed boundaries and used for 
authenticating touchscreen interaction scores. High trust scores 
imply lower perceived threat and therefore the threshold is 
lowered resulting in greater usability. Low trust scores imply 
higher perceived threat and therefore the threshold is 
heightened resulting in greater security. Each subsequent 
touchscreen interaction after the training phase has features 
extracted and passed to a classifier. The classifier produces a 
score that is compared to the current adapted threshold. We 
show the process of our proposed framework in Figure 1. 
B. Data Capture 
To collect the data required for authentication we design an 
application for the Android mobile platform. We use Android 
in our study because it is a widely used mobile operating system 
and also provides considerable freedom to access device 
features and functionality (such as sensor readings) through 
APIs. Our application is set to start immediately on boot and 
collect data passively in the background with no user interaction 
required. Collected sensor data is written to the internal device 
storage. 
Our application collects data readings from the 
accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, proximity, ambient 
lighting, gravity, and pressure sensors every 50 milliseconds. 
Wi-fi, Bluetooth, cellular, user activity and GPS readings are 
also captured when available each minute. We construct a 
touch-gesture collection module that runs alongside our sensor 
collection processes. This module runs in the background 
passively recording all features of all touchscreen gestures 
made on the device. Each touchscreen gesture is comprised of 
individual touch points that denote a change in the x or y of the 
touchscreen gesture.  We make it clear that our application can 
collect data in all scenarios and does not need interaction with 
a custom application like in [2]. As in [17], we interact with the 
Linux kernel to record touch data due to Android security 
limitations.  
C. User Profiles 
We use data collected over a training period to build models 
that describe the user. In our experimental framework, we use 
10 days of previously collected data as we find this to be 
detailed enough for convergence between days. As the sensor 
readings are collected during the training period they contribute 
toward building a set of probability density functions for each 
different sensor for each of the current anchors. We use 
temporal and spatial anchors represented by each hour and each 
cell tower reading, respectively (as in [4]) as well as an activity 
anchor that we introduce to allow a probability density function 
to describe expected sensor readings when the user is carrying 
out an identifiable activity (e.g.: walking).  
Separate probability density functions are constructed for 
each attribute of a sensor with multiple attributes (e.g.: x, y and 
z axes for accelerometer). Probability density functions are 
created using histograms for discrete data and kernel density 
functions for continuous data. The benefits of such probability 
density functions include the low computational cost of 
updating them, allowing for adaptability. Scores obtained from 
sensor readings using this scheme are combined to form the 
trust score T using Equation 1. 
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We use 5-fold cross validation on the sensor training data to 
calculate a set of genuine scores for each sensor in each anchor 
for a user. We use these genuine scores to compute an 
appropriate minimum expected score, exp, for each sensor, a 
factor below the mean as in Equation 2. 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = �1
𝑛𝑛
�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
� − �𝑠𝑠 × �1
𝑛𝑛
�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�� 
 
 
Figure 1: The framework for our proposed adaptive threshold 
scheme. The symbol pdf represents a probability density 
function which scores sensor sn readings for an anchor An,n 
producing a score snsrc. 
 
(2) 
 
Deviations above or below this score from subsequent 
sensor readings are scaled such that they provide a score scrscl 
between -1 and 1. This is for used increasing or decreasing the 
touchscreen gesture threshold. We use the expected minimum 
score exp as well as the average deviation of the folded scores 
scrf in our computation. We show our method for this in 
Equation 3. 
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The touchscreen gestures captured over the training period 
for each user are pre-processed to generate a well-known 
feature set [2]. To collect more detailed data from a touch event 
we discard any touch-gesture less than 8 touch points. The 
touch-gestures for the users are used to train a continuous touch-
gesture classification scheme, following state-of-the-art 
approaches. 
D. Threshold Adaption 
One of the key novelties of our scheme compared to other 
approaches that use passive and interactive biometrics [14] is 
that we use the passive sensor biometrics to adapt a threshold 
for the interactive biometrics rather than simply averaging the 
scores. We compute a base threshold by using 5-fold cross 
validation to generate scores for the touch-gesture training data 
such that we can find the threshold, thr, at the EER (when 
FAR=FRR). We compute upper, u, and lower, l, boundaries that 
govern the maximum and minimum values the threshold can 
take. These are calculated based on the deviation of the cross-
validated scores from the threshold obtained at the EER, as in 
Equations 4 and 5. 
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  As defined, the sensor trust is represented as a value 
between -1 and 1 (where 1 is the highest trust). This used to 
create an adapted threshold from sensor readings periodically. 
Equation 6 calculates the adapted threshold, adpt: 
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 Such an equation ensures that when the trust level is 
negative due to mistrust the threshold is increased (enhancing 
security) and is decreased when the trust level is positive due to 
trust (enhancing usability). 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our adaptive 
framework through experimentation. We discuss the datasets 
we used in our study and the pre-processing techniques we use 
to extract discernable features for system users. We then discuss 
the experiments we perform with on our system to assess the 
accuracy, robustness and efficiency 
A. Datasets 
To test our hypothesis and verify the validity of our results, 
we use two different datasets. Each dataset comprises of 
information from a variety of mobile device sensors. 
MSC (Mobile Sensor Collection) Dataset: To model 
passive sensor data in this study we produce and use our own 
MSC dataset. We produced this dataset because we feel it 
uniquely combines all sensors that have been show to 
previously yield identifying information. The dataset contains 
sensor readings from 6 different participants. Each participant 
used a Nexus 4 device installed with our custom data collection 
application as their main device for a minimum of 14 days. Our 
dataset provides passively collected sensor readings from the 
accelerometer, Bluetooth, GPS, gravity, gyroscope, light, 
magnetometer, noise, cellular, proximity, wifi and pressure 
sensors. The dataset also includes all touchscreen interactions 
performed by the participants. The information collected from 
each sensor is detailed in Table 1. Our dataset is uniquely 
detailed in that it contains more than 10GB of sensor data and 
more than 3,000 touch-gestures for each user. 
GCU (Glasgow Caledonian University) Dataset: The 
GCU dataset [4] contains sensor data from their staff and 
Modality MSC Dataset GCU Dataset 
Accelerometer Event time, X, Y, Z Event time, X, Y, Z 
Bluetooth Event time, List of 
Device IDs & Strength 
N/A 
GPS Event time, Lat., Lon. N/A 
Gravity Event time, X, Y, Z N/A 
Gyroscope Event time, X, Y, Z Event time, X, Y, Z 
Ambient Light Event time, Light value  Event time, Light value 
Magnetometer Event time, X, Y, Z Event time, X, Y, Z 
Ambient Noise Event time, average noise 
value 
Event time, min. noise 
value, average noise 
value, max. noise value 
Cellular Event time, List of Cell 
IDs 
Event time, Connected 
Cell ID 
Proximity Event time, Proximity 
value 
N/A 
Wifi Networks Event time, List of Wifi 
Networks & Strengths 
Event time, List of Wifi 
Networks 
Pressure Event time, Pressure 
value 
N/A 
Activity Event time, List of 
Activities (walking, 
driving, cycling, still, 
vehicle, running, tilting, 
unknown) & Probabilities 
N/A 
Touch Gesture Event time, List of touch 
points (each with: time, 
X, Y, area, pressure) 
N/A 
System Usage N/A Event time, System CPU 
load, Use CPU load 
App Usage N/A Event time, Current open 
apps 
 
Table 1: The sensors recorded by the MSC and GCU datasets 
including the type of information obtained from each sensor. 
students. The dataset was collected via their custom Android 
app and comprises of sensor readings from light, wi-fi, 
application usage, cellular, noise and system stats. The data is 
collected from each user for a minimum of 14 days. The 
publicly available dataset that is used in this study contains data 
from 4 users. The information collected from each sensor is 
detailed in Table 1. The dataset contains between 190MB and 
670MB for each participant depending on the duration of the 
data collection period. 
B. Pre-processing 
We extract all strokes with a length of 8 touch points or 
above for each user from the touch data. In [1], a set of 
identifying features were successfully extracted from the raw 
data. We adopt and compute 29 of these features for each 
stroke. Descriptions of the features extracted are provided in 
Table 1. 
We process the sensor files for each user, reducing the 
sample rate of continuously updated sensors to 500ms rather 
than 50ms. We do this because our tests found little 
improvement when comparing the two sampling rates due to the 
system taking an average of values over a time period to obtain 
a score. The decrease in sampling improves in efficiency. 
C. Evaluation Metrics 
As is common in biometric studies, we assess the 
effectiveness of our system by using the following metrics:  
i) False Acceptance Rate (FAR): This is the rate that an 
impostor is wrongly classified as the genuine user. 
ii) False Rejection Rate (FRR): This is the rate that the 
genuine user is wrongly classified as an impostor. 
iii) Equal Error Rate (EER): This is the rate at which FAR and 
FRR are equal to each other. FAR and FRR sets are 
usually obtained as an acceptance threshold is adjusted. 
FAR and FRR pairs are correlated such that if one 
increases the other decreases. In our experiments 
EER=(FAR+FRR)/2 for the FAR and FRR with the 
smallest difference. 
D. Accuracy, Usability and Security 
In this experiment, we evaluate the improved accuracy of 
our adaptive framework system compared to a state-of-the-art 
continuous authentication method. We perform these 
experiments on both sensor dataset and include all of the 
participants in each experiment. 
For both the MSC dataset and the GCU dataset we build 
user profiles using sensor data over a 10-day training phase. We 
construct the KDEs and histograms for temporal and spatial 
anchors discussed in Section III. We then build the touchscreen 
gesture classification part of our scheme. We base our approach 
on the single classifier scheme in in [3]. We therefore use a 
Random Forest [18] classifier from the Weka API [19] because 
it was shown to yield the best results for gesture classification. 
We train the classifier on 10 days of touchscreen gestures. The 
positive dataset contains the genuine user gestures and the 
negative dataset contains the gestures of every other user. The 
GCU dataset does not contain touchscreen gestures. We 
therefore randomly assign each user in the GCU dataset with a 
touchscreen gesture collection from our dataset so we can use it 
in our scheme. We compute a static threshold by using 5-fold 
cross validation on the training data and selecting the threshold 
at the EER. 
Each trained profile from a dataset is then tested by 
processing the next 4 remaining days of sensor and touchscreen 
gesture data of the genuine user and each impostor user in the 
current dataset. This results in our framework producing a score 
for each of the touch gestures observed in the test set that is 
measured against an adapting threshold at the time the 
interaction was performed. In the GCU dataset the touchscreen 
gestures do not correspond to a specific score at a time in the 
 Static Threshold 
Scheme 
Adaptive Threshold 
Scheme 
 FRR FAR FRR FAR 
User 1 8.62 9.30 5.60 1.64 
User 2 17.23 17.63 8.07 4.93 
User 3 37.89 13.89 24.21 7.34 
User 4 16.66 21.13 8.79 5.35 
User 5 10.20 13.46 7.95 6.24 
User 6 6.46 13.02 4.10 5.44 
Average 16.18 14.74 9.79 5.16 
User 1 5.58 29.52 2.87 7.02 
User 2 14.30 33.62 8.72 15.26 
User 3 31.86 33.13 16.48 10.26 
User4 19.45 29.32 10.51 11.65 
Average 17.80 31.40 9.65 11.02 
 
Table 3: The FARs and FRRs of the static threshold system 
compared to the FARs and FRRs achieved when using our 
adaptive threshold scheme. 
Feature ID Description 
Feature 1 Mid stroke area covered 
Feature 2 20% pairwise velocity 
Feature 3 Direction of end to end line 
Feature 4 Start x coordinate 
Feature 5 Stop x coordinate 
Feature 6 Average direction 
Feature 7 Start y coordinate 
Feature 8 Stop y coordinate 
Feature 9 Average velocity 
Feature 10 Stroke duration 
Feature 11 Direct end to end distance 
Feature 12 Length of trajectory 
Feature 13 80% pairwise velocity 
Feature 14 Median velocity at last 3 points 
Feature 15 50% pairwise velocity 
Feature 16  20% pairwise acceleration 
Feature 17  Ratio end to end distance & length of trajectory 
Feature 18 Largest deviation from end to end line 
Feature 19 80% pairwise acceleration 
Feature 20 Mean resultant length 
Feature 21 Median acceleration at first five points 
Feature 22 50% dev from end to end line 
Feature 23 Interstroke time 
Feature 24 80% dev from end to end line 
Feature 25 20% dev from end to end line 
Feature 26 50% pairwise acceleration 
Feature 27 Mid stroke finger orientation 
Feature 28 Mid stroke pressure 
Feature 29 Phone orientation 
Table 2: The 29 features extracted from each touch event. 
 
dataset because they were not collected together, unlike the 
MSC dataset, so we therefore select an adapting threshold at a 
random time for the touchscreen gesture. We perform the same 
experiment without our adaptive threshold scheme such that the 
classifier scores are matched against the static threshold 
obtained at the point of EER. 
For each user, we record the number of falsely accepted and 
falsely rejected touchscreen gestures such that we can compute 
FAR and FRR values. We present the results of this experiment 
in Table 3. We find that for our adaptive classification scheme 
we achieve consistently lower false acceptance and false 
rejection. We show the effectiveness of our scheme in Figure 2. 
The adaptive nature of the threshold can clearly be seen to 
decrease the threshold increasing usability in known 
environments and increase the threshold increasing security in 
unknown environments. 
E. Activity as an Anchor 
We experiment with using the detected activity of a user as 
an anchor. Sensor readings taken during a specific activity (e.g.: 
walking) are compared to the probabilistic models for that 
activity anchor. We repeat the previous experiment, this time 
including the activity of a user as an anchor. We only perform 
this experiment using the MSC dataset because the GCU dataset 
does not include activity. 
We find that scores from activity anchors for continuous 
sensors (such as accelerometer) prove unreliable and sporadic. 
We explain this due to the limited number of activities and 
therefore a saturation of different sensor readings for each. This 
experiment therefore uses only GPS, Bluetooth, wi-fi and 
celluar tower sensor data. We show the results of this 
experiment in Table 4. Comparing these results to the results in 
Table 3 that were achieved with only temporal and spatial 
anchors, we find that the addition of an activity ….  
 
F. Attack Scenarios 
In this experiment, we show how our system can achieve 
results improving on state-of-the-art techniques that make 
decisions solely on passive sensor data. We explore attacks 
carried out by informed and uninformed attackers [20].  
The uninformed attacker is the most common class of 
attacker. This attacker represents an individual that has no 
knowledge of the authentication scheme on the device or the 
way in which the genuine user uses the device; they can be 
thieves who take a device from a user and begin using it with 
no additional security concern. We model this user by taking a 
device from 3 users in our study and attempting to gain access 
using impostor touchscreen gestures. We find XXXXXX. 
An informed attacker is difficult to detect because they have 
familiarity with the environment in which the genuine user uses 
the device and the way in which they use it. To perform this 
attack on our system, we train our model for each user in the 
MSC dataset. We then test the trained scheme on genuine user 
sensor data and touchscreen gesture from all other users to 
model impostors using the device in a known environment. This 
tells us the robustness of the system if an impostor intentionally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Graphs when a trained adaptive threshold scheme is 
tested on a genuine and impostor users. The graphs depict the 
scores of touchscreen gestures as black dots, the dynamic 
threshold as a red line, and the static threshold as a blue line. 
 
 Adaptive Threshold Scheme with Activity Anchor 
 FRR FAR 
User 1   
User 2   
User 3   
User 4   
User 5   
User 6   
Average   
 
Table 4: The EERs FARs and FRRs achieved when using our 
adaptive threshold scheme with an anchor representing the 
user activity. 
uses the device in a genuine user environment to attempt to 
bypass the authentication scheme. We find XXXXXX.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a novel mobile continuous 
authentication framework that compromises between usability 
and security for touchscreen gestures based on passively 
collected sensor readings. We describe our framework and the 
techniques for threshold adaption. We collected our own 
experimental dataset for the study consisting of detailed sensor 
and touchscreen gesture data. We show that our framework can 
improve on the state-of-the-art static threshold schemes when 
authenticating different users. We show that our scheme can 
offer additional robustness when detecting impostor users that 
have stolen the device. We argue that our scheme provides a 
better compromise between usability and security than other 
state-of-the-art continuous authentication schemes.  
VI. FUTURE WORK  
The future work of this research will concentrate on 
furthering this framework by addressing its current limitations. 
Firstly, we will explore how to better combine the sensor scores 
and anchors. We will endeavor to investigate the contributions 
of each sensor and each anchor toward the final trust score. This 
will enable us to apply weightings to each sensor and anchor 
such that they contribute to the final score in the most effective 
and reliable way. Using the sensor data collected we will also 
investigate more refined classification approaches for each 
sensor as [21] does for their 3 sensor datasets. We could, for 
example, apply techniques that look beyond noise levels but 
into types of noises or voices as in [22]. 
The second area we intend to look into is the ability to 
continually update the biometric profile seamlessly over time. 
The issue of concept drift [23] results in biometrics drifting 
from the profile over time and therefore weakening the 
accuracy of the biometric authentication system. We will 
explore techniques suitable for updating the both the passive 
and interactive biometric profiles of a user efficiently on mobile 
devices. Methods to alleviate concept drift in continuous 
authentication schemes is a little researched area.   
Finally, our future work will look into additional biometric 
modalities that we could add as part of this adaptive threshold 
scheme. We will primarily investigate what other forms of 
interaction we can include in our scheme in addition to 
touchscreen gestures. Additional interactive biometrics would 
allow us authenticate the user more regularly and improve the 
security of the scheme.  
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